@techreport{aronow2020,
  title = {Evidence of {{Rising Rates}} of {{Inattentiveness}} on {{Lucid}} in 2020},
  author = {Aronow, Peter Michael and Kalla, Joshua and Orr, Lilla and Ternovski, John},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  institution = {{SocArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31235/osf.io/8sbe4},
  urldate = {2020-11-17},
  abstract = {Lucid has become increasingly popular as a low-cost provider of online survey responses. In this memo, we share our concerns about Lucid's recent data quality. First, a large and increasing number of survey respondents are failing attention checks. Second, respondents who pass and respondents who fail attention checks are systematically different. Many respondents who fail standard attention checks appear to provide low-quality data. We conclude that researchers should exercise caution when analyzing data recently collected from Lucid unless respondents were subject to stringent attention checks.},
  keywords = {Methodology,Online samples},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/GU7NDCNI/Aronow et al. - 2020 - Evidence of Rising Rates of Inattentiveness on Luc.pdf}
}

@article{bartels2005a,
  title = {Homer {{Gets}} a {{Tax Cut}}: {{Inequality}} and {{Public Policy}} in the {{American Mind}}},
  author = {Bartels, Larry M},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {15--31},
  abstract = {In 2001 and 2003, the Bush administration engineered two enormous tax cuts primarily benefiting very wealthy taxpayers. Most Americans supported these tax cuts. I argue that they did so not because they were indifferent to economic inequality, but because they largely failed to connect inequality and public policy. Three out of every four people polled said that the difference in incomes between rich people and poor people has increased in the past 20 years, and most of them added that that is a bad thing\textemdash but most of those people still supported the regressive 2001 Bush tax cut and the even more regressive repeal of the estate tax. Several manifestly relevant considerations had negligible or seemingly perverse effects on these policy views, including assessments of the wastefulness of government spending and desires for additional spending on a variety of government programs. Support for the Bush tax cuts was strongly shaped by people's attitudes about their own tax burdens, but virtually unaffected by their attitudes about the tax burden of the rich\textemdash even in the case of the estate tax, which only affects the wealthiest one or two percent of taxpayers. Public opinion in this instance was ill informed, insensitive to some of the most important implications of the tax cuts, and largely disconnected from (or misconnected to) a variety of relevant values and material interests.},
  keywords = {Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/E8MXYL5L/Bartels - Homer Gets a Tax Cut Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind - 2005.pdf}
}

@article{bobzien2020,
  ids = {bobzien2019},
  title = {Polarized Perceptions, Polarized Preferences? {{Understanding}} the Relationship between Inequality and Preferences for Redistribution},
  shorttitle = {Polarized Perceptions, Polarized Preferences?},
  author = {Bobzien, Licia},
  year = {2020},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of European Social Policy},
  volume = {30},
  number = {2},
  pages = {206--224},
  issn = {0958-9287, 1461-7269},
  doi = {10.1177/0958928719879282},
  urldate = {2022-03-30},
  abstract = {When studying the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution, it is often assumed \textendash either implicitly or explicitly \textendash{} that individuals are informed about actual levels of inequality. Newer research, however, challenges this assumption and shows that perceived inequality differs from actual inequality. Empirically, these inequality perceptions are rather good predictors for preferences for redistribution. This article argues that individuals answer the standard question for measuring preferences for redistribution based on their inequality perceptions. I conduct a simple regression analysis based on two waves of the ISSP (1999 and 2009) and show that (1) inequality perceptions are systematically linked to socio-economic variables as well as to ideological beliefs rather than to actual inequality. Then, I disaggregate the variance in inequality perceptions to a part which is explainable by socio-economic and ideological determinants (the common control variables for explaining preferences for redistribution) and an unexplained part. I show that (2) the explained as well as the unexplained variance part is associated with preferences for redistribution. I argue that this finding makes considering inequality perceptions practically relevant since standard control variables do not fully account for variation in perceived inequality.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - attitudes,Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/73NYUQW3/Bobzien - 2020 - Polarized perceptions, polarized preferences Unde.pdf}
}

@techreport{bogard2022,
  type = {Preprint},
  title = {Heuristics and {{Biases}} in {{Evaluations}} of {{Economic Inequality}}},
  author = {Bogard, Jonathan and West, Colin and Fox, Craig},
  year = {2022},
  month = feb,
  institution = {{In Review}},
  doi = {10.21203/rs.3.rs-1278751/v1},
  urldate = {2022-02-28},
  abstract = {How money ought to be distributed among different groups is a critical question influencing elections and policymaking. In eight pre-registered studies (N=4,188) we show that people across the political spectrum are systematically biased when making judgments about economic inequality. We hypothesize that people reduce the complexity associated with such judgments by relying on a simplifying strategy in which they mainly focus on differences in wealth between the most salient groups, usually the richest versus poorest groups. This implies two biases. First, judgments about economic distributions are under-sensitive to differences in the size of identified population groups. This results in greater tolerance for inequality and lower support for redistributional policies when richer groups are composed of fewer individuals than poorer groups (e.g., comparing the richest 10\% versus the rest of the country). Second, judgments systematically underweight information about intermediate groups relative to the richest and poorest groups. This leads to a systematic neglect of the prosperity of the middle class. We show that these biases influence downstream policy support as strongly as differences in partisanship, and we conclude by proposing guidelines for presenting economic distributions in ways that are less susceptible to these biases.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/73ZDRFJ6/Bogard et al. - 2022 - Heuristics and Biases in Evaluations of Economic I.pdf}
}

@article{boudreau2018,
  title = {Wanting {{What Is Fair}}: {{How Party Cues}} and {{Information About Income Inequality Affect Public Support}} for {{Taxes}}},
  author = {Boudreau, Cheryl and MacKenzie, Scott A.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The Journal of Politics},
  volume = {80},
  number = {2},
  pages = {367--381},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2405294},
  abstract = {Income inequality has risen dramatically in the United States, with potentially negative social, economic, and political consequences. Governments can use redistributive tax policies to combat inequality, but doing so requires public support. When will voters support redistributive tax policies? We address this question by conducting survey experiments where citizens express opinions about tax policies in a real-world context. We manipulate whether they receive party cues, information about rising income inequality, both, or neither type of information. We find that when citizens are given information about income inequality, they connect it to their views on redistributive tax policies. We also find that inequality information can induce Republicans to support a tax increase that their party opposes. These results challenge the prominent view of citizens as too ignorant to connect information about inequality to specific taxes. They also suggest that efforts to inform the electorate about inequality can influence tax policy opinions.},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/CMFNQ8LA/160081Appendix.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/CVNLBMT3/Boudreau, MacKenzie - Wanting What Is Fair How Party Cues and Information About Income Inequality Affect Public Support for Taxes - 2018.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/GDNQYNJ4/Boudreau_MacKenzie_JOP_Codebook.pdf}
}

@article{cansunar2021,
  title = {Who Is {{High-Income}}, {{Anyway}}?: {{Social Comparison}}, {{Subjective Group-Identification}}, and {{Preferences}} over {{Progressive Taxation}}},
  shorttitle = {Who Is {{High-Income}}, {{Anyway}}?},
  author = {Cansunar, Asli},
  year = {2021},
  month = oct,
  journal = {The Journal of Politics},
  volume = {83},
  number = {4},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3816},
  doi = {10.1086/711627},
  urldate = {2020-09-30},
  abstract = {Why are high-income and low-income earners not significantly polarized in their support for progressive income taxation? This article posits that the affluent fail to recognize that they belong to the high-income income group and this misperception affects their preferences over progressive taxation. To explain this mechanism theoretically, I introduce a formal model of subjective income group-identification through self-comparison to an endogenous reference group. In making decisions about optimal tax rates, individuals then use these subjective evaluations of their own income group and earnings of other groups. Relying on ISSP data, I find strong evidence for the model's empirical implications: most high-income earners support progressive taxation when they identify themselves with a lower group. Additionally, individuals who overestimate the earnings of the rich are more likely to support progressive taxation.},
  keywords = {Information effects,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/CWAH2AT3/Cansunar - 2020 - Who is High-Income, Anyway Social Comparison, Su.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/KC3HDLKA/711627.html}
}

@article{chambers2014,
  title = {Better off than We Know: Distorted Perceptions of Incomes and Income Inequality in {{America}}.},
  author = {Chambers, John R and Swan, Lawton K and Heesacker, Martin},
  year = {2014},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  volume = {25},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {24317422},
  eprinttype = {pubmed},
  pages = {613--8},
  issn = {1467-9280},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797613504965},
  urldate = {2015-03-03},
  abstract = {Three studies examined Americans' perceptions of incomes and income inequality using a variety of criterion measures. Contrary to recent findings indicating that Americans underestimate wealth inequality, we found that Americans not only overestimated the rise of income inequality over time, but also underestimated average incomes. Thus, economic conditions in America are more favorable than people seem to realize. Furthermore, ideological differences emerged in two of these studies, such that political liberals overestimated the rise of inequality more than political conservatives. Implications of these findings for public policy debates and ideological disagreements are discussed.},
  pmid = {24317422},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/K4E9JFHE/Chambers, Swan, Heesacker - Better off than we know distorted perceptions of incomes and income inequality in America. - 2014.pdf}
}

@techreport{ciani2021,
  type = {{{OECD Papers}} on {{Well-being}} and {{Inequalities}}},
  ids = {ciani2020},
  title = {Learning about Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: {{A}} Meta-Analysis of in-Survey Informational Experiments},
  shorttitle = {Learning about Inequality and Demand for Redistribution},
  author = {Ciani, Emanuele and Freget, Louis and Manfredi, Thomas},
  year = {2021},
  month = nov,
  series = {{{OECD Papers}} on {{Well-being}} and {{Inequalities}}},
  volume = {02},
  number = {02},
  doi = {10.1787/8876ec48-en},
  urldate = {2022-04-12},
  abstract = {A growing body of literature studies the effect of providing information about inequality to respondents of surveys on their preferences for redistribution. We provide a meta-analysis combining the results from 84 information treatments coming from 36 studies in Economics, Political Science, Psychology and Sociology. This meta-analysis complements and informs a broader project on perceptions of inequality and preferences for redistribution (OECD, 2021[1]). In the meta-analysis, we focus on in-survey experiments where a randomly selected group of respondents receive either information about the overall extent of inequalities, or about their position in the income distribution. The results show that providing information on inequality has a sizeable impact on people's perceptions and concerns about inequality, but a rather small effect on their demand for redistribution. Inspecting the heterogeneity across treatments and outcomes helps explaining the small average effect on demand for redistribution, but the evidence is not yet conclusive about the potential explanations. We further show that correcting respondents' misperceptions about their own position in the income distribution increases the preferences for redistribution for those who previously overestimated their position and decreases it for those who underestimated, although the effects are, on average, small.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/JY89G5FU/2021 - Learning about inequality and demand for redistrib.pdf}
}

@article{coppock2019,
  title = {Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents},
  author = {Coppock, Alexander and McClellan, Oliver A.},
  year = {2019},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Research \& Politics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {2053168018822174},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Ltd}},
  issn = {2053-1680},
  doi = {10.1177/2053168018822174},
  urldate = {2022-04-29},
  abstract = {Researchers have increasingly turned to online convenience samples as sources of survey responses that are easy and inexpensive to collect. As reliance on these sources has grown, so too have concerns about the use of convenience samples in general and Amazon's Mechanical Turk in particular. We distinguish between ``external validity'' and theoretical relevance, with the latter being the more important justification for any data collection strategy. We explore an alternative source of online convenience samples, the Lucid Fulcrum Exchange, and assess its suitability for online survey experimental research. Our point of departure is the 2012 study by Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz that compares Amazon's Mechanical Turk to US national probability samples in terms of respondent characteristics and treatment effect estimates. We replicate these same analyses using a large sample of survey responses on the Lucid platform. Our results indicate that demographic and experimental findings on Lucid track well with US national benchmarks, with the exception of experimental treatments that aim to dispel the ``death panel'' rumor regarding the Affordable Care Act. We conclude that subjects recruited from the Lucid platform constitute a sample that is suitable for evaluating many social scientific theories, and can serve as a drop-in replacement for many scholars currently conducting research on Mechanical Turk or other similar platforms.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Methodology,Online samples},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/FFMWL66A/Coppock and McClellan - 2019 - Validating the demographic, political, psychologic.pdf}
}

@article{cruces2013,
  ids = {cruces2013a},
  title = {Biased Perceptions of Income Distribution and Preferences for Redistribution: {{Evidence}} from a Survey Experiment},
  author = {Cruces, Guillermo and Truglia, Ricardo Perez and Tetaz, Martin},
  year = {2013},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {98},
  pages = {100--112},
  publisher = {{Elsevier B.V.}},
  issn = {00472727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.10.009},
  urldate = {2013-03-09},
  abstract = {Individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and public finance models, yet there is little evidence regarding their origins or accuracy. This study examines how individuals form these perceptions and posits that systematic biases arise from the extrapolation of information extracted from reference groups. A tailored household survey provides original evidence on the significant biases in individuals' evaluations of their own relative position in the distribution. Furthermore, the data supports the hypothesis that the selection process into the reference groups is the source of those biases. Finally, this study also assesses the practical relevance of these biases by examining their impact on attitudes towards redistributive policies. An experimental design incorporated into the survey provides consistent information on the own ranking within the income distribution to a randomly selected group of respondents. Confronting agents' biased perceptions with this information has a significant effect on their stated preferences for redistribution. Those who had overestimated their relative position and thought of themselves relatively richer than they were demand higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking. This relationship between biased perceptions and political attitudes provides an alternative explanation for the relatively low degree of redistribution observed in modern democracies.},
  pmid = {21712252},
  keywords = {Behavioral economics,Economic inequality,Income inequality,Inequality - consequences,Inequality - perceptions,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/Q2SU8XIN/Cruces et al. - 2013 - Biased perceptions of income distribution and pref.pdf}
}

@article{davidai2018,
  title = {How Should We Think about {{Americans}}' Beliefs about Economic Mobility?},
  author = {Davidai, Shai and Gilovich, Thomas},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  volume = {13},
  number = {3},
  pages = {297--304},
  abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that Americans' beliefs about upward mobility are overly optimistic. Davidai \& Gilovich (2015a), Kraus \& Tan (2015), and Kraus (2015) all found that people overestimate the likelihood that a person might rise up the economic ladder, and underestimate the likelihood that they might fail to do so. However, using a different methodology, Chambers, Swan and Heesacker (2015) reported that Americans' beliefs about mobility are much more pessimistic. Swan, Chambers, Heesacker and Nero (2017) provide a much-needed summary of these conflicting findings and question the utility of measuring population-level biases in judgments of inequality and mobility. We value their summary but argue that their conclusion is premature. By focusing on measures that best tap how laypeople naturally think about the distribution of income, we believe that researchers can draw meaningful conclusions about the public's perceptions of economic mobility. When more ecologically representative measures are used, the consistent finding is that Americans overestimate the extent of upward mobility in the United States. To explain the divergent findings in the literature, we provide evidence that the methods used by Chambers et al. (2015) inadvertently primed participants to think about immobility rather than mobility. Finally, using a novel method to examine beliefs about economic mobility, we show that Americans indeed overestimate the degree of mobility in the United States.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/N3A9GAXF/Davidai and Gilovich - How should we think about Americans’ beliefs about.pdf}
}

@article{eriksson2012,
  title = {What Do {{Americans}} Know about Inequality? {{It}} Depends on How You Ask Them},
  author = {Eriksson, Kimmo and Simpson, Brent},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  volume = {7},
  number = {6},
  pages = {741--745},
  issn = {19302975},
  abstract = {A recent survey of inequality (Norton and Ariely, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 9\textendash 12) asked respondents to indicate what percent of the nation's total wealth is\textemdash and should be\textemdash controlled by richer and poorer quintiles of the U.S. population. We show that such measures lead to powerful anchoring effects that account for the otherwise remarkable findings that respondents reported perceiving, and desiring, extremely low inequality in wealth. We show that the same anchoring effects occur in other domains, namely web page popularity and school teacher salaries. We introduce logically equivalent questions about average levels of inequality that lead to more accurate responses. Finally, when we made respondents aware of the logical connection between the two measures, the majority said that typical responses to the average measures, indicating higher levels of inequality, better reflected their actual perceptions and preferences than did typical responses to percent measures.},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Methodology,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/4KYM4FY2/Eriksson, Simpson - What do Americans know about inequality It depends on how you ask them - 2012(2).pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/SSLG45IP/Eriksson, Simpson - What do Americans know about inequality It depends on how you ask them - 2012.pdf}
}

@article{fernandez-albertos2018,
  title = {Income {{Perception}}, {{Information}}, and {{Progressive Taxation}}: {{Evidence}} from a {{Survey Experiment}}},
  shorttitle = {Income {{Perception}}, {{Information}}, and {{Progressive Taxation}}},
  author = {{Fern{\'a}ndez-Albertos}, Jos{\'e} and Kuo, Alexander},
  year = {2018},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {83--110},
  issn = {2049-8470, 2049-8489},
  doi = {10.1017/psrm.2015.73},
  urldate = {2019-05-09},
  abstract = {Are individuals accurately informed about their place in the income distribution? Despite the importance of accurate information about one's placement in the income distribution for many models of redistribution, this assumption remains untested. We present survey data and an embedded experiment where we inform some individuals their true place in the income distribution. We then assess the impact of such information on tax progressivity preferences. We find that individuals have considerable error regarding their self-placement in the income distribution. Revealing to individuals their true placement affects progressivity preferences for individuals who learn they are poor, and for individuals whose prior is that they are poor. These results have implications for information assumptions of redistribution models of comparative political economy and contribute to our understanding of tax preferences, an understudied dimension of redistribution preferences.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Attitudes,Income inequality,Inequality - consequences,Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/KFS3W7P2/Fernández-Albertos and Kuo - 2018 - Income Perception, Information, and Progressive Ta.pdf}
}

@article{garcia-castro2022,
  title = {Changing Attitudes toward Redistribution: {{The}} Role of Perceived Economic Inequality in Everyday Life and Intolerance of Inequality},
  shorttitle = {Changing Attitudes toward Redistribution},
  author = {{Garc{\'i}a-Castro}, Juan Diego and Gonz{\'a}lez, Roberto and Frigolett, Cristi{\'a}n and {Jim{\'e}nez-Moya}, Gloria and {Rodr{\'i}guez-Bail{\'o}n}, Rosa and Willis, Guillermo},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  journal = {The Journal of Social Psychology},
  volume = {0},
  number = {0},
  pages = {1--16},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  issn = {0022-4545},
  doi = {10.1080/00224545.2021.2006126},
  urldate = {2022-01-05},
  abstract = {Modern societies are characterized by economic inequality. Redistributive policies are one of the means to reduce it. We argue that perceived economic inequality in everyday life and intolerance of it are central factors to enhance positive attitudes toward redistribution. To test it, we conducted a four-wave longitudinal panel study in Chile with a sample of 1221 college students (at T1 \textendash{} baseline, 960 at T2, 926 at T3, and 787 at T4; Mage = 18.89). As expected, a cross-lagged longitudinal analysis controlled by household income confirmed a positive relationship between perceived economic inequality in everyday life and intolerance of inequality, which in turn was positively associated with support for redistributive policies. These results were stable and consistent over time, supporting the idea that perceived economic inequality in everyday life enhances positive attitudes toward redistribution by increasing intolerance of it. Results highlight the important role played by perceived inequality in everyday life.},
  pmid = {34978955},
  keywords = {Economic inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/92UY6RIC/García-Castro et al. - 2022 - Changing attitudes toward redistribution The role.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/J6YLBDRX/00224545.2021.html}
}

@article{graham2021,
  title = {Asking {{About Attitude Change}}},
  author = {Graham, Matthew H and Coppock, Alexander},
  year = {2021},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  volume = {85},
  number = {1},
  pages = {28--53},
  issn = {0033-362X},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfab009},
  urldate = {2023-05-03},
  abstract = {Surveys often ask respondents how information or events changed their attitudes. Does [information X] make you more or less supportive of [policy Y]? Does [scandal X] make you more or less likely to vote for [politician Y]? We show that this type of question (the change format) exhibits poor measurement properties, in large part because subjects engage in response substitution. When asked how their attitudes changed, people often report the level of their attitudes rather than the change in them. As an alternative, we propose the counterfactual format, which asks subjects what their attitude would have been in the counterfactual world in which they did not know the treatment information. Using a series of experiments embedded in four studies, we show that the counterfactual format greatly reduces bias relative to the change format.},
  keywords = {Attitudes,Methodology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/KF664WPB/Graham and Coppock - 2021 - Asking About Attitude Change.pdf}
}

@article{graham2023,
  title = {Measuring {{Misperceptions}}?},
  author = {Graham, Matthew H.},
  year = {2023},
  month = feb,
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  volume = {117},
  number = {1},
  pages = {80--102},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  issn = {0003-0554, 1537-5943},
  doi = {10.1017/S0003055422000387},
  urldate = {2023-05-03},
  abstract = {Survey data are commonly cited as evidence of widespread misperceptions and misinformed beliefs. This paper shows that surveys generally fail to identify the firm, deep, steadfast, confidently held beliefs described in leading accounts. Instead, even those who report 100\% certain belief in falsehoods about well-studied topics like climate change, vaccine side effects, and the COVID-19 death toll exhibit substantial response instability over time. Similar levels of response stability are observed among those who report 100\% certain belief in benign, politically uncontested falsehoods\textemdash for example, that electrons are larger than atoms and that lasers work by focusing sound waves. As opposed to firmly held misperceptions, claims to be highly certain of incorrect answers are best interpreted as ``miseducated'' guesses based on mistaken inferential reasoning. Those reporting middling and low levels of certainty are best viewed as making close-to-blind guesses. These findings recast existing evidence as to the prevalence, predictors, correction, and consequences of misperceptions and misinformed beliefs.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects,Numeracy},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/ZD5UFVIH/Graham - 2023 - Measuring Misperceptions.pdf}
}

@article{guay,
  title = {Rethinking {{Perceived Threat}} \& {{Contact}}: {{Misperceptions About}} the {{Size}} of {{Groups}} in {{Society}}},
  author = {Guay, Brian and Marghetis, Tyler and Wong, Cara and Landy, David},
  pages = {38},
  abstract = {Misperceptions about the size of demographic groups in society, particularly racial minority groups, are among the most cited instances of citizen ignorance. Yet little is understood about their origins and existing theories of perceived threat and social contact have received little empirical support. Using survey data containing over 35,000 estimates of the size of demographic groups in over 20 countries, we show that these misperceptions are far better explained by the psychology of how people estimate quantities in general than by attitudes toward particular groups. Individuals systematically bias their estimates toward a central prior belief, particularly when they are uncertain. We find strong support for this Bayesian account in a direct test against theories of perceived threat and social contact using estimates of the size of the Black, Hispanic, Asian-American, and White population. We conclude by discussing implications for how researchers measure and interpret beliefs about politically relevant quantities.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/NE3C58F5/Guay et al. - Rethinking Perceived Threat & Contact Mispercepti.pdf}
}

@article{heiserman2021,
  title = {Measuring {{Perceptions}} of {{Economic Inequality}} and {{Justice}}: {{An Empirical Assessment}}},
  shorttitle = {Measuring {{Perceptions}} of {{Economic Inequality}} and {{Justice}}},
  author = {Heiserman, Nicholas and Simpson, Brent},
  year = {2021},
  month = may,
  journal = {Social Justice Research},
  issn = {1573-6725},
  doi = {10.1007/s11211-021-00368-x},
  urldate = {2021-05-27},
  abstract = {How should we measure people's perceptions of\textemdash and attitudes about\textemdash economic~inequality? A recent literature seeks to quantify the level of inequality that people, especially Americans, perceive and prefer in society. These findings have garnered much attention from both social scientists and the public. But many of the methods used in this literature are either known to have methodological issues or have not been thoroughly compared against other methods. Thus it is not clear which, if any, are valid and reliable measures of perceived, or preferred, inequality. To assess these measures, we conducted a large web-based study (N\,=\,831) to compare key methods for measuring perceived inequality and their related justice attitudes. In addition to comparing the resultant summary statistics, we assess how well the different measures correlate with each other and with Likert scale measures of perceived inequality. Our analysis reveals a range of issues with these measures, including failure to provide logical responses, large method effects on point estimates of inequality, and low correlations between methods and with criteria measures. We conclude our analysis with three recommendations for researchers aiming to measure inequality perceptions and preferences.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Favorites,Inequality - perceptions,Methodology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/WE26JUXB/Heiserman and Simpson - 2021 - Measuring Perceptions of Economic Inequality and J.pdf}
}

@article{jachimowicz2022,
  title = {Inequality in Researchers' Minds: {{Four}} Guiding Questions for Studying Subjective Perceptions of Economic Inequality},
  shorttitle = {Inequality in Researchers' Minds},
  author = {Jachimowicz, Jon M. and Davidai, Shai and {Goya-Tocchetto}, Daniela and Szaszi, Barnabas and Day, Martin V. and Tepper, Stephanie J. and Phillips, L. Taylor and Mirza, M. Usman and Ordabayeva, Nailya and Hauser, Oliver P.},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys},
  volume = {n/a},
  number = {n/a},
  issn = {1467-6419},
  doi = {10.1111/joes.12507},
  urldate = {2022-04-27},
  abstract = {Subjective perceptions of inequality can substantially influence policy attitudes, public health metrics, and societal well-being, but the lack of consensus in the scientific community on how to best operationalize and measure these perceptions may impede progress on the topic. Here, we provide a theoretical framework for the study of subjective perceptions of inequality, which brings critical differences to light. This framework\textemdash which we conceptualize as a series of four guiding questions for studying subjective perceptions of economic inequality\textemdash serves as a blueprint for the theoretical and empirical decisions researchers need to address in the study of when, how, and why subjective perceptions of inequality are consequential for individuals, groups, and societies. To lay the foundation for a comprehensive approach to the topic, we offer four theoretical and empirical decisions in studying subjective perceptions of inequality, urging researchers to specify: (1) What kind of inequality? (2) What level of analysis? (3) What part of the distribution? and (4) What comparison group? We subsequently discuss how this framework can be used to organize existing research and highlight its utility in guiding future research across the social sciences in both the theory and measurement of subjective perceptions of inequality.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Economic inequality},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/DZ2RE6YX/Jachimowicz et al. - Inequality in researchers’ minds Four guiding que.pdf}
}

@article{jasso1977,
  ids = {jasso2011},
  title = {Distributive {{Justice}} and {{Earned Income}}},
  author = {Jasso, Guillermina and Rossi, Peter H.},
  year = {1977},
  journal = {American Sociological Review},
  volume = {42},
  number = {4},
  pages = {639--651},
  abstract = {This is an empirical exploration of the normative criteria for just distributions of earned income. The results indicate that the fairness of earnings is judged relative to a set of criteria which includes (but perhaps is not limited to) formal educational attainment, occupational attain- ment, sex, marital status and knowledge of family earnings. That is, both merit and need factors combine to produce judgments of fairness and unfairness. These criteria for just earnings appear to be held consensually and are largely independent of the raters' observable demographic attributes.},
  keywords = {Fairness,Income inequality,Inequality - attitudes,Sociology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/K78ZMP6E/Unknown - No Title - 2011.pdf}
}

@article{jasso2000,
  title = {Trends in the {{Experience}} of {{Injustice}}: {{Justice Indexes About Earnings}} in {{Six Societies}}, 1991 \textendash{} 1996},
  author = {Jasso, Guillermina},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Social Justice Research},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {101--122},
  abstract = {This paper examines trends in the experience of injustice in six societies\textemdash Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East andWestGermany, Hungary, and Russia\textemdash between 1991 and 1996. Using data collected by the International Social Justice Project, we estimate the justice index, JI1,andits decomposition into theamountof injustice attributable to poverty and the amount of injustice attributable to inequality; and we also examine gender differences in the justice index and its decomposition. The justice index is a summary measure of individuals' justice evaluations, and therefore the paper also takes a preliminary look at the two basic quantities that underlie the justice evaluation\textemdash actual earnings and just earnings\textemdash and their determinants, investigating, for the men of East and West Germany, the actual and just returns to schooling and experience in 1991 and 1996},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Methodology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/6I946W8U/Jasso - Trends in the Experience of Injustice Justice Indexes About Earnings in Six Societies, 1991 – 1996 - 2000.pdf}
}

@article{kahneman2003,
  title = {A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality.},
  author = {Kahneman, Daniel},
  year = {2003},
  month = sep,
  journal = {The American psychologist},
  volume = {58},
  number = {9},
  eprint = {14584987},
  eprinttype = {pubmed},
  pages = {697--720},
  issn = {0003-066X},
  doi = {10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697},
  urldate = {2010-07-15},
  abstract = {Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.},
  pmid = {14584987},
  keywords = {Behavioral economics,Political psychology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/REJLM2NN/Tseng - Behavioral finance, bounded rationality, neuro-finance, and traditional finance - 2006.pdf}
}

@article{kalleitner2023,
  title = {The {{Inequity Z}}: {{Income Fairness Perceptions}} in {{Europe}} across the {{Income Distribution}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Inequity Z}}},
  author = {Kalleitner, Fabian and Bohmann, Sandra},
  year = {2023},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Socius},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {23780231231167138},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  issn = {2378-0231},
  doi = {10.1177/23780231231167138},
  urldate = {2023-04-20},
  abstract = {Using data from the European Social Survey, we examine income fairness evaluations of 17,605 respondents from 28 countries. Respondents evaluated the fairness of their own incomes as well as the fairness of the incomes of the top and bottom income deciles in their countries. Depicted on a single graph, these income fairness evaluations take on a Z-shaped form, which we call the ?inequity Z?. The inequity Z reveals an extensive level of consensus within each country regarding the degree of unfairness of top and bottom incomes. With rising income, respondents consistently judge their own incomes to be less unfair. Across countries, the gap in fairness ratings between top and bottom incomes rises with income inequality. Perceived underreward of bottom incomes is more pronounced in countries where bottom incomes are objectively lower. Thus, this visualization suggests that, when people are confronted with information about actual income levels, perceived inequity increases with inequality.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - attitudes},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/IX8PVRKF/Kalleitner and Bohmann - 2023 - The Inequity Z Income Fairness Perceptions in Eur.pdf}
}

@article{karadja2017,
  title = {Richer (and {{Holier}}) {{Than Thou}}? {{The Effect}} of {{Relative Income Improvements}} on {{Demand}} for {{Redistribution}}},
  author = {Karadja, Mounir and M{\"o}llerstr{\"o}m, Johanna and Seim, David},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
  volume = {99},
  number = {2},
  pages = {201--212},
  abstract = {We study the extent to which people are misinformed about their relative position in the income distribution and the effects on preferences for redistribution of correcting faulty beliefs. We implement a tailor-made survey in Sweden and document that a vast majority of Swedes believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are. This is true across groups, but younger, poorer, less cognitively able and less educated individuals have perceptions that are further from reality. Using a second survey, we conduct an experiment by randomly informing a subsample about their true relative income position. Respondents who learn that they are richer than they thought demand less redistribution and increase their support for the Conservative party. This result is entirely driven by prior right-of-center political preferences and not by altruism or moral values about redistribution. Moreover, the effect can be reconciled by people with political preferences to the right-of-center being more likely to view taxes as distortive and to believe that it is personal effort rather than luck that is most influential for individual economic success},
  keywords = {Inequality - consequences,Information effects,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/VBRTPESY/Karadja et al. - 2017 - Richer (and Holier) Than Thou The Effect of Relat.pdf}
}

@article{kim2020,
  title = {Misunderstanding {{Income Inequality}} and {{Its Policy Consequences}}},
  author = {Kim, Eunji and Pedersen, Rasmus T and Mutz, Diana C},
  year = {2020},
  pages = {17},
  abstract = {Why does rising income inequality not result in further demand for redistribution? Explanations typically focus on public misperceptions about the extent of income inequality. We propose an alternative argument suggesting that many Americans misunderstand what inequality means in the first place. We find that Americans have a poor understanding of variance in income relative to absolute levels of income. Using a population-based survey experiment, our results suggest that most people are unable to differentiate policies that address poverty from those that reduce inequality. Even those most concerned about inequality generally favor raising everyone's incomes rather than decreasing inequality. If they favor redistributive policies at all, they are in favor of raising the incomes of the poor. In the minds of most Americans, poverty, not inequality understood in the sense of variance in income, is the central problem.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/MVX4XFAS/Kim et al. - Misunderstanding Income Inequality and Its Policy .pdf}
}

@article{knell2020,
  title = {Perceptions of Inequality},
  author = {Knell, Markus and Stix, Helmut},
  year = {2020},
  month = dec,
  journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {65},
  number = {December 2020},
  pages = {101927},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  issn = {0176-2680},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101927},
  urldate = {2022-08-11},
  abstract = {Individual perceptions of (income or wealth) inequality have strong effects on their decisions as economic agents or voters. It is therefore important to know more about the relation between perceived and measured inequality. We present a novel formal framework that is based on the assumption that people typically do not observe the entire income (wealth) distribution and that their guesses about the extent of inequality are based on ``self-centered'' reference groups. This framework predicts that perceptions of inequality will change along positions in the income distribution and that for a specific position various dimensions of inequality perception are related to each other. First, low (high) income individuals overestimate (underestimate) their own position. Second, subjective estimates of average earnings increase with the own income position. Third, high or low income people have different perceptions about the skewness and the ``shape'' of the income distribution (e.g. pyramid or diamond). Fourth, the subjective perception of inequality is lower for high-income individuals. Survey data from 40 countries provide strong support for the framework.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/5S6KD6PI/S0176268020300756.html}
}

@book{lamont1994,
  title = {Money, {{Morals}}, and {{Manners}}: {{The Culture}} of the {{French}} and the {{American Upper-Middle Class}}},
  shorttitle = {Money, {{Morals}}, and {{Manners}}},
  author = {Lamont, Mich{\`e}le},
  year = {1994},
  month = oct,
  series = {Morality and {{Society Series}}},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  address = {{Chicago, IL}},
  urldate = {2022-12-06},
  abstract = {Drawing on remarkably frank, in-depth interviews with 160 successful men in the United States and France, Mich\`ele Lamont provides a rare and revealing collective portrait of the upper-middle class\textemdash the managers, professionals, entrepreneurs, and experts at the center of power in society. Her book is a subtle, textured description of how these men define the values and attitudes they consider essential in separating themselves\textemdash and their class\textemdash from everyone else.Money, Morals, and Manners is an ambitious and sophisticated attempt to illuminate the nature of social class in modern society. For all those who downplay the importance of unequal social groups, it will be a revelation. "A powerful, cogent study that will provide an elevated basis for debates in the sociology of culture for years to come."\textemdash David Gartman, American Journal of Sociology"A major accomplishment! Combining cultural analysis and comparative approach with a splendid literary style, this book significantly broadens the understanding of stratification and inequality. . . . This book will provoke debate, inspire research, and serve as a model for many years to come."\textemdash R. Granfield, Choice"This is an exceptionally fine piece of work, a splendid example of the sociologist's craft."\textemdash Lewis Coser, Boston College},
  isbn = {978-0-226-46817-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{lamont2002,
  title = {The {{Dignity}} of {{Working Men}}: {{Morality}} and the {{Boundaries}} of {{Race}}, {{Class}}, and {{Immigration}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Dignity}} of {{Working Men}}},
  author = {Lamont, Mich{\`e}le},
  year = {2002},
  month = oct,
  series = {Russell {{Sage Foundation Books}} at {{Harvard University Press}}},
  publisher = {{Russell Sage Foundation Books at Harvard University Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
  abstract = {Mich\`ele Lamont takes us into the world inhabited by working-class men\textemdash the world as they understand it. Interviewing black and white working-class men who, because they are not college graduates, have limited access to high-paying jobs and other social benefits, she constructs a revealing portrait of how they see themselves and the rest of society. Morality is at the center of these workers' worlds. They find their identity and self-worth in their ability to discipline themselves and conduct responsible but caring lives. These moral standards function as an alternative to economic definitions of success, offering them a way to maintain dignity in an out-of-reach American dreamland. But these standards also enable them to draw class boundaries toward the poor and, to a lesser extent, the upper half. Workers also draw rigid racial boundaries, with white workers placing emphasis on the ``disciplined self'' and blacks on the ``caring self.'' Whites thereby often construe blacks as morally inferior because they are lazy, while blacks depict whites as domineering, uncaring, and overly disciplined. This book also opens up a wider perspective by examining American workers in comparison with French workers, who take the poor as ``part of us'' and are far less critical of blacks than they are of upper-middle-class people and immigrants. By singling out different ``moral offenders'' in the two societies, workers reveal contrasting definitions of ``cultural membership'' that help us understand and challenge the forms of inequality found in both societies.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-00992-9},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/4VIAGR2D/catalog.html}
}

@article{landy2018,
  title = {Bias and Ignorance in Demographic Perception},
  author = {Landy, D. and Guay, B. and Marghetis, T.},
  year = {2018},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review},
  volume = {25},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1606--1618},
  issn = {1531-5320},
  doi = {10.3758/s13423-017-1360-2},
  urldate = {2022-11-09},
  abstract = {When it comes to knowledge of demographic facts, misinformation appears to be the norm. Americans massively overestimate the proportions of their fellow citizens who are immigrants, Muslim, LGBTQ, and Latino, but underestimate those who are White or Christian. Previous explanations of these estimation errors have invoked topic-specific mechanisms such as xenophobia or media bias. We reconsidered this pattern of errors in the light of more than 30 years of research on the psychological processes involved in proportion estimation and decision-making under uncertainty. In two publicly available datasets featuring demographic estimates from 14 countries, we found that proportion estimates of national demographics correspond closely to what is found in laboratory studies of quantitative estimates more generally. Biases in demographic estimation, therefore, are part of a very general pattern of human psychology\textemdash independent of the particular topic or demographic under consideration\textemdash that explains most of the error in estimates of the size of politically salient populations. By situating demographic estimates within a broader understanding of general quantity estimation, these results demand reevaluation of both topic-specific misinformation about demographic facts and topic-specific explanations of demographic ignorance, such as media bias and xenophobia.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/8JZBLGNL/Landy et al. - 2018 - Bias and ignorance in demographic perception.pdf}
}

@article{lawrence2014,
  title = {The Consequences of Political Innumeracy},
  author = {Lawrence, Eric D and Sides, John},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Research \& Politics},
  volume = {July-Septe},
  pages = {1--8},
  doi = {10.1177/2053168014545414},
  abstract = {The prevalence of political innumeracy \textendash{} or ignorance of politically relevant numbers \textendash{} is well-documented. However, little is known about its consequences. We report on three original survey experiments in which respondents were randomly assigned to see correct information about the racial composition of the US population, median income and educational attainment, and the unemployment and poverty rates. Although estimates of these quantities were frequently far from the truth, providing correct information had little effect on attitudes toward relevant public policies},
  keywords = {Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/4SAAXF6G/Lawrence, Sides - The consequences of political innumeracy - 2014.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/H5JUS5Z4/Lawrence, Sides - The consequences of political innumeracy - 2014(2).pdf}
}

@techreport{lis2018,
  title = {Luxembourg {{Income Study}} ({{LIS}}) {{Database}}},
  author = {LIS},
  year = {2018},
  address = {{Luxembourg}}
}

@article{lopez2018,
  title = {Why {{So Serious}}?: {{Survey Trolls}} and {{Misinformation}}},
  author = {Lopez, Jesse and Hillygus, D Sunshine},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {1--28},
  issn = {1556-5068},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3131087},
  keywords = {Methodology,Online samples},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/K77ZKSUZ/Lopez, Hillygus - Why So Serious Survey Trolls and Misinformation - 2018.pdf}
}

@article{marghetis,
  title = {The Psychophysics of Society: {{Uncertain}} Estimates of Invisible Entities},
  author = {Marghetis, Tyler and Guay, Brian and Karlapudy, A and Landy, David},
  pages = {6},
  abstract = {Large-scale societies are impossible to perceive directly. Unsurprisingly, lay demographic estimates are wildly inaccurate. How should we interpret these errors? Most accounts assume these errors are evidence of topic-specific biases and prejudices. (e.g., ``People overestimate immigration because immigrants threaten the status quo.'') But this glosses over the distortions that are introduced whenever underlying perceptions are translated into explicit numerical estimates. For instance, estimates are typically hedged, or `rescaled,' toward an expected value \textemdash{} a perfectly rational strategy when information is uncertain. We show that uncertainty-based rescaling accounts for most error in individual demographic estimates. Residual errors were not even always in the same direction; populations that appeared to have been over-estimated (e.g., AsianAmericans) now appear to be under-estimated. The amount of rescaling engaged in by an individual was proportional to their uncertainty (about politics or about numbers). Perceptions of society are surprisingly good; the psychophysics of estimation gets in the way.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/NSC72QKZ/Marghetis et al. - The psychophysics of society Uncertain estimates .pdf}
}

@article{merola2016a,
  title = {Numeracy and the {{Persuasive Effect}} of {{Policy Information}} and {{Party Cues}}},
  author = {M{\'e}rola, Vittorio and Hitt, Matthew P.},
  year = {2016},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  volume = {80},
  number = {2},
  pages = {554--562},
  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
  issn = {0033-362X},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfv051},
  urldate = {2020-06-02},
  abstract = {Numeric political appeals represent a prevalent but overlooked domain of public opinion research. When can quantitative information change political attitudes, and is this change trumped by partisan effects? We analyze how numeracy\textemdash or individual differences in citizens' ability to process and apply numeric policy information\textemdash moderates the effectiveness of numeric political appeals on a moderately salient policy issue. Results show that those low in numeracy exhibit a strong party-cue effect, treating numeric information in a superficial and heuristic fashion. Conversely, those high in numeracy are persuaded by numeric information, even when it is sponsored by the opposing party, overcoming the party-cue effect. Our results make clear that overlooking numeric ability when analyzing quantitative political appeals can mask significant persuasion effects, and we build on recent work advancing the understanding of individual differences in public opinion.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cognition,Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/PDSVWKW9/Mérola and Hitt - 2016 - Numeracy and the Persuasive Effect of Policy Infor.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/FJBJL9P3/2588809.html}
}

@article{moniz2022,
  title = {Facts in {{Context}}: {{Problem Perceptions}}, {{Numerical Information}}, and {{Policy Attitudes}}},
  shorttitle = {Facts in {{Context}}},
  author = {Moniz, Philip},
  year = {2022},
  month = dec,
  journal = {American Politics Research},
  pages = {1532673X221148674},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Inc}},
  issn = {1532-673X},
  doi = {10.1177/1532673X221148674},
  urldate = {2023-01-24},
  abstract = {How does policy-relevant information change citizens? policy attitudes? Though giving numerical information about social conditions has been found, at times, to change policy attitudes, why it works (or doesn?t) is poorly understood. I argue new or corrective information may not translate into policy-attitude change in part because it fails to instill a sense of need for change. Perceived problem seriousness, an affect-laden judgment about the acceptability of the status quo, may therefore be the proposed an important psychological mechanism through which information changes people?s minds. To perceive a problem, conditions must be worse than they ought be. Previous research, however, presents numerical information without a point of reference from which citizens can base their judgments. By contextualizing facts with reference points from the past (time) as well as other countries (space), four survey experiments show that numerical information about a range of social problems can change policy attitudes by first changing their perceived seriousness.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects,Numeracy},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/PLZI4KFP/Moniz - 2022 - Facts in Context Problem Perceptions, Numerical I.pdf}
}

@article{nero2018,
  title = {Still No Compelling Evidence That {{Americans}} Overestimate Upward Socio-Economic Mobility Rates: {{Reply}} to {{Davidai}} \& {{Gilovich}} (2018)},
  author = {Nero, Sondre S and Swan, Lawton K and Chambers, John R and Heesacker, Martin},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  volume = {13},
  number = {3},
  pages = {305--308},
  abstract = {Davidai and Gilovich (2018) contend that (a) Americans tend to think about their nation's income distribution in terms of quintiles (fifths), and (b) when Americans' perceptions of socio-economic mobility rates are measured properly (e.g., by asking online survey respondents to guess upward-mobility rates across quintiles), a trend of overestimation (too much optimism concerning the number of people who manage to transcend poverty) will emerge. In this reply, we hail Davidai and Gilovich's new data as novel, important, and relevant to the former (a), but we doubt that they can support the latter (b) claim about population-level (in)accuracy. Namely, we note that even if mobility-rate perceptions could be measured perfectly, inferences about the accuracy of those perceptions still depend on a particular comparator\textemdash a point-estimate of the "true" rate of upward social mobility in the U.S. against which survey respondents' guesses are evaluated\textemdash that is itself an error-prone estimate. Applying different established comparators to survey respondents' guesses changes both the direction and magnitude of previously observed overestimation effects. We conclude with a challenge: researchers who wish to compute the average distance between socio-economic perceptions and socio-economic reality must first select and justify a fair comparator.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Mobility},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/3CGTGYGK/Nero et al. - Still no compelling evidence that Americans overes.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/4RI7CUMM/2018-anson-economy-twitter.pdf}
}

@article{newman2018,
  title = {Who Sees an Hourglass? {{Assessing}} Citizens' Perception of Local Economic Inequality:},
  shorttitle = {Who Sees an Hourglass?},
  author = {Newman, Benjamin J. and Shah, Sono and Lauterbach, Erinn},
  year = {2018},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Research \& Politics},
  publisher = {{SAGE PublicationsSage UK: London, England}},
  doi = {10.1177/2053168018793974},
  urldate = {2022-04-29},
  abstract = {The scholarly literature is observing a slow but steady growth in research exploring the effects of subnational economic inequality on political attitudes and b...},
  copyright = {\textcopyright{} The Author(s) 2018},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions,Local inequality},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/L3A69CVA/Newman et al. - 2018 - Who sees an hourglass Assessing citizens’ percept.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/R3EQAWGV/2053168018793974.html}
}

@article{niehues2014,
  title = {Subjective {{Perceptions}} of {{Inequality}} and {{Redistributive Preferences}} : {{An International Comparison}}},
  author = {Niehues, Judith},
  year = {2014},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/MFCFL2ME/Niehues - Subjective Perceptions of Inequality and Redistributive Preferences An International Comparison - 2014.pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/YYCMN3PQ/Niehues - Subjective Perceptions of Inequality and Redistributive Preferences An International Comparison - 2014(2).pdf}
}

@article{norton2011a,
  title = {Building a {{Better America}} - {{One Wealth Quintile}} at a {{Time}}},
  author = {Norton, Michael I. and Ariely, Dan},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {9--12},
  issn = {17456916},
  doi = {10.1177/1745691610393524},
  abstract = {Disagreements about the optimal level of wealth inequality underlie policy debates ranging from taxation to welfare. We attempt to insert the desires of ``regular'' Americans into these debates, by asking a nationally representative online panel to estimate the current distribution of wealth in the United States and to ``build a better America'' by constructing distributions with their ideal level of inequality. First, respondents dramatically underestimated the current level of wealth inequality. Second, respondents constructed ideal wealth distributions that were far more equitable than even their erroneously low estimates of the actual distribution. Most important from a policy perspective, we observed a surprising level of consensus: All demographic groups \textendash{} even those not usually associated with wealth redistribution such as Republicans and the wealthy \textendash{} desired a more equal distribution of wealth than the status quo.},
  keywords = {Behavioral economics,Income inequality,Inequality - attitudes,Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/3GS6EC7P/Norton, Ariely - Building a better America-one wealth quintile at a time - 2011.pdf}
}

@misc{oecd2014,
  type = {Doi:{{https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00707-en}}},
  title = {Regional Well-Being},
  author = {OECD},
  year = {2014},
  howpublished = {https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/data/data-00707-en}
}

@article{osberg2006,
  title = {"{{Fair}}" {{Inequality}}? {{Attitudes}} toward {{Pay Differentials}}: {{The United States}} in {{Comparative Perspective}}},
  author = {Osberg, L. and Smeeding, T.},
  year = {2006},
  month = jun,
  journal = {American Sociological Review},
  volume = {71},
  number = {3},
  pages = {450--473},
  issn = {0003-1224},
  doi = {10.1177/000312240607100305},
  urldate = {2011-07-11},
  abstract = {Are American attitudes toward economic inequality different from those in other countries? One tradition in sociology suggests American ``exceptionalism,'' while another argues for convergence across nations in social norms, such as attitudes toward inequality. This article uses International Social Survey Program (ISSP) microdata to compare attitudes in different countries toward what individuals in specific occupations ``do earn'' and what they ``should earn,'' and to distinguish value preferences for more egalitarian outcomes from other confounding attitudes and perceptions. The authors suggest a method for summarizing individual preferences for the leveling of earnings and use kernel density estimates to describe and compare the distribution of individual preferences over time and cross-nationally. They find that subjective estimates of inequality in pay diverge substantially from actual data, and that although Americans do not, on the average, have different preferences for aggregate (in)equality, there is evidence for: 1. Less awareness concerning the extent of inequality at the top of the income distribution in America 2. More polarization in attitudes among Americans 3. Similar preferences for ``leveling down'' at the top of the earnings distribution in the United States, but also 4. Less concern for reducing differentials at the bottom of the distribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/AZQNH8RZ/Osberg, Smeeding - Fair Inequality Attitudes toward Pay Differentials The United States in Comparative Perspective - 2006.pdf}
}

@article{pedersen2019,
  title = {Attitudes {{Toward Economic Inequality}}: {{The Illusory Agreement}}},
  author = {Pedersen, Rasmus T and Mutz, Diana C},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {835--851},
  issn = {2049-8470},
  doi = {10.1017/psrm.2018.18},
  abstract = {R ecent studies of attitudes toward economic inequality suggest that most people around the world prefer very low levels of inequality, despite well-known trends toward greater inequality within many countries. Even within countries, people across the political spectrum are said to be in remarkable agreement about the ideal level of economic inequality. Using survey data from 40 countries and a novel survey experiment in the United States, we show that this apparent agreement is illusory. When relying on a widely used cross-national survey measure of Ideal Pay Ratios, preferred levels of inequality are heavily influenced by two well-documented sources of perceptual distortion: the anchoring effect and ratio bias. These effects are substantial and many times larger than the influence of fundamental political predis-positions. As a result, these cross-national survey measures tapping preferences regarding economic inequality produce misleading conclusions about desired levels of inequality. I ssues of economic inequality are at the heart of politics, and attitudes toward inequality are generally regarded as the most important defining characteristic of the political left-right continuum (Arian and Shamir 1983). Further, income inequality has increased dramatically in recent years both within the United States and within many European countries (Piketty and Saez 2001; Piketty and Saez 2006; Piketty 2014). As a result, economic inequality has reappeared as a key issue in the study of politics (Shaw and Gaffey 2012; Luttig 2013; McCall 2013; Iversen and Soskice 2015; Shariff, Wiwad and Aknin 2016). Numerous studies have investigated public attitudes toward inequality using a set of specific survey questions about the perceived and preferred earnings of people in different occupations. Two major conclusions have emerged from studies using these measures. First, by comparing answers to these survey questions with real pay data from various countries, scholars have repeatedly concluded that people generally want dramatically less economic inequality than what actually exists within their country (Kelley and Evans 1993; Svallfors 1993; Svallfors 1997; Kelley and Zagorski 2004; Osberg and Smeeding 2006). Second, these measures have also shown a seemingly strong consensus on the desired level of income inequality across the political spectrum. People to the left and to the right on the political spectrum exhibit a remarkable level of agreement about the ideal level of inequality (Kiatpongsan and Norton 2014). In this study we argue that both of these findings are artifacts of the questions commonly used to measure attitudes toward inequality. Preferences for greater or lesser inequality are most frequently tapped using a series of questions about perceived actual pay of CEOs and workers, and ideal CEO and worker pay. These items have been widely used by many survey organizations including the General Social},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - attitudes,Information effects},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/975FM7A2/Pedersen, Mutz - Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality The Illusory Agreement - 2018.pdf}
}

@misc{phillips2020,
  title = {Inequality in {{People}}'s {{Minds}}},
  author = {Phillips, L. Taylor and Tepper, Stephanie and {Goya-Tocchetto}, Daniela and Davidai, Shai and Ordabayeva, Nailya and Mirza, M. Usman and Szaszi, Barnabas and Day, Martin V. and Hauser, Oliver and Jachimowicz, Jon},
  year = {2020},
  month = sep,
  publisher = {{PsyArXiv}},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/vawh9},
  urldate = {2022-08-09},
  abstract = {The extent of inequality that people perceive in the world is often a better predictor of individual and societal outcomes than the level of inequality that actually exists. As such, scholars from across the social sciences, including economics, sociology, psychology, and political science, have recently worked to understand individuals' (mis)perceptions of inequality. Unfortunately, many researchers treat the process underlying such perceptions as a black box, focusing predominantly on lay people's numeric estimates of inequality, and paying less attention to how people come to form these perceptions or what these perceptions mean to participants. In the current review, we draw on research in perception, cognition, and developmental and social psychology, to introduce a novel comprehensive framework for understanding individuals' perceptions of inequality. We argue that subjective perceptions of inequality should be viewed as a process that unfolds across five interlinked and iterative stages. To form perceptions of the scope of inequality in society, people need to (1) have access to inequality cues in the world, (2) attend to these cues, (3) comprehend these cues, (4) process these cues (often succumbing to motivational biases), and (5) summarize these cues into a meaningful representation of inequality. Our framework highlights when and why lay people may misperceive the scope of inequality in society and provides a roadmap for research to examine how the processes in people's minds affect the outcomes researchers are ultimately interested in.},
  langid = {american},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/PMMXLZS3/Phillips et al. - 2020 - Inequality in People's Minds.pdf}
}

@book{pontusson2020,
  title = {Introducing the {{Inequality}} and {{Politics Survey}}: {{Preliminary Findings}}},
  shorttitle = {Introducing the {{Inequality}} and {{Politics Survey}}},
  author = {Pontusson, Jonas and Giger, Nathalie and Rosset, Jan and Lascombes, Davy-Kim},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  doi = {10.13140/RG.2.2.33389.74720},
  abstract = {Inequality and Politics is an online survey that was carried out in thirteen West European countries and the United States in 2019. The dataset includes representative samples of at least 2000 respondents per country. The survey probes citizens' perceptions of economic and political inequalities and their attitudes towards "inequality-correcting policies." This manuscript explains the theoretical motivations behind the survey, describes the dataset and presents some preliminary findings pertaining to five themes: perceptions of economic inequality, nor-mative evaluations of inequality, explanations that respondents give for inequalities, perceptions of political inequality and redistributive policy preferences. Our findings shed new light on the political effects of economic inequality in a comparative perspective.},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/WEYFD5L2/Pontusson et al. - 2020 - Introducing the Inequality and Politics Survey Pr.pdf}
}

@article{quealy2019,
  title = {Are {{You Rich}}? {{This Income-Rank Quiz Might Change How You See Yourself}}},
  shorttitle = {Are {{You Rich}}?},
  author = {Quealy, Kevin and Gebeloff, Robert and Taylor, Rumsey},
  year = {2019},
  month = aug,
  journal = {The New York Times},
  issn = {0362-4331},
  urldate = {2022-08-11},
  abstract = {Five questions to help you compare yourself with your neighbors. (For Americans only.)},
  chapter = {The Upshot},
  langid = {american},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/XBYX5FMY/are-you-rich.html}
}

@article{rai2011,
  title = {Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation: {{Moral}} Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality.},
  shorttitle = {Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation},
  author = {Rai, Tage Shakti and Fiske, Alan Page},
  year = {2011},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Psychological Review},
  volume = {118},
  number = {1},
  pages = {57--75},
  issn = {1939-1471, 0033-295X},
  doi = {10.1037/a0021867},
  urldate = {2022-03-30},
  abstract = {Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. We extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1991) to identify 4 fundamental and distinct moral motives. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The 4 moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), relationship regulation theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and ``impure'' acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. This approach facilitates clearer understanding of moral perspectives we disagree with and provides a template for how to influence moral motives and practices in the world.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/VMTTWGU5/Rai and Fiske - 2011 - Moral psychology is relationship regulation Moral.pdf}
}

@techreport{riffkin2014,
  title = {Americans {{Say Federal Gov}}'t {{Wastes}} 51 {{Cents}} on the {{Dollar}}},
  author = {Riffkin, Rebecca},
  year = {2014},
  month = sep,
  institution = {{Gallup News}},
  urldate = {2022-03-30},
  abstract = {Americans say the federal government wastes about half of each tax dollar it receives. They consider state and local governments a bit less wasteful, but still believe each wastes at least a third of each tax dollar.},
  chapter = {Politics},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/FB7WRI9H/americans-say-federal-gov-wastes-cents-dollar.html}
}

@article{shaw2017,
  title = {It's Not Fair: {{Folk}} Intuitions about Disadvantageous and Advantageous Inequity Aversion},
  author = {Shaw, Alex and {Choshen-Hillel}, Shoham},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  volume = {12},
  number = {3},
  pages = {208--223},
  abstract = {People often object to inequity; they react negatively to receiving less than others (disadvantageous inequity aversion), and more than others (advantageous inequity aversion). Here we study people's folk intuitions about inequity aversion: what do people infer about others' fairness concerns, when they observe their reactions to disadvantageous or advantageous inequity? We hypothesized that, people would not intuitively regard disadvantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness, but they would regard advantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness. In four studies, we used vignettes describing inequity aversion of a made up alien species to assess people's folk intuitions about inequity aversion. The studies supported our main hypothesis that disadvantageous inequity aversion, without advantageous inequity aversion, does not fit people's folk conception of fairness. Instead, participants reported it to be rooted in envy. According to these results, the claim that disadvantageous inequity aversion reveals a concern with fairness, does not readily accord with people's intuitions. We connect these findings to other pieces of evidence in the literatures of behavioral economics, developmental psychology, and social psychology, indicating that lay people's intuitions may be on the mark in this case. Specifically, unlike advantageous inequity aversion, disadvantageous inequity aversion need not be rooted in a sense of fairness.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Fairness},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/E27WKVY8/Shaw and Choshen-Hillel - It’s not fair Folk intuitions about disadvantageo.pdf}
}

@article{shoemaker2002,
  title = {Item {{Nonresponse}}: {{Distinguishing}} between Don't {{Know}} and {{Refuse}}},
  shorttitle = {Item {{Nonresponse}}},
  author = {Shoemaker, Pamela J. and Eichholz, Martin and Skewes, Elizabeth A.},
  year = {2002},
  month = jun,
  journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {193--201},
  issn = {0954-2892},
  doi = {10.1093/ijpor/14.2.193},
  urldate = {2022-03-29},
  abstract = {The detrimental effects of item nonresponse on survey samples and question outcomes have been studied for many years. However, the difference between don't know answers and refusals\textemdash two kinds of item nonresponse\textemdash has not been examined empirically. This study used the theoretical constructs question sensitivity and cognitive effort to distinguish between don't knows and refusals and examined 242 questions from various national surveys. The results show that more sensitive questions get more refusals while questions that require more cognitive effort to be answered receive more don't knows. However, cognitive effort also correlates significantly with refusals. Thus, to decrease refusals, researchers should pay special attention to cognitive effort as well as sensitivity. To decrease don't knows, researchers should focus mostly on cognitive effort.},
  keywords = {Methodology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/9SJ9DHKH/719736.html}
}

@article{sturgis2010a,
  title = {Fictitious {{Issues Revisited}}: {{Political Interest}}, {{Knowledge}} and the {{Generation}} of {{Nonattitudes}}},
  shorttitle = {Fictitious {{Issues Revisited}}},
  author = {Sturgis, Patrick and Smith, Patten},
  year = {2010},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Political Studies},
  volume = {58},
  number = {1},
  pages = {66--84},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Ltd}},
  issn = {0032-3217},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00773.x},
  urldate = {2022-03-29},
  abstract = {It has long been suspected that, when asked to provide opinions on matters of public policy, significant numbers of those surveyed do so with only the vaguest understanding of the issues in question. In this article, we present the results of a study which demonstrates that a significant minority of the British public are, in fact, willing to provide evaluations of non-existent policy issues. In contrast to previous American research, which has found such responses to be most prevalent among the less educated, we find that the tendency to provide `pseudo-opinions' is positively correlated with self-reported interest in politics. This effect is itself moderated by the context in which the political interest item is administered; when this question precedes the fictitious issue item, its effect is greater than when this order is reversed. Political knowledge, on the other hand, is associated with a lower probability of providing pseudo-opinions, though this effect is weaker than that observed for political interest. Our results support the view that responses to fictitious issue items are not generated at random, via some `mental coin flip' . Instead, respondents actively seek out what they consider to be the likely meaning of the question and then respond in their own terms, through the filter of partisan loyalties and current political discourses.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Attitudes,Methodology},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/KTU2P4I7/Sturgis and Smith - 2010 - Fictitious Issues Revisited Political Interest, K.pdf}
}

@article{suhay2020,
  title = {Ideology of {{Affluence}}: {{Rich Americans}}'~{{Explanations}} for {{Inequality}} and {{Attitudes}} toward {{Redistribution}}},
  shorttitle = {Ideology of {{Affluence}}},
  author = {Suhay, Elizabeth and Klasnja, Marko and Rivero, Gonzalo},
  year = {2020},
  month = may,
  journal = {The Journal of Politics},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3816},
  doi = {10.1086/709672},
  urldate = {2020-05-09},
  abstract = {As economic inequality increases, so does the importance of understanding affluent perspectives on the problem. We examine whether affluent Americans are more likely than others to hold individuals responsible for economic outcomes, and if such beliefs are associated with their attitudes toward redistribution. We conducted a novel survey that oversampled the top 5\% of the U.S. income and wealth distributions. We elicited views about why some people achieve more success than others (intelligence, hard work, family wealth, luck) as well as why people vary in success-linked traits (their choices, environments, genes). Affluent Americans were more likely than others to tie economic outcomes to intelligence and hard work, and the top 1\% were unique in emphasizing both choices and genes as causes of those traits. This individualization of economic outcomes was more strongly associated with economic conservatism among the affluent than others, suggesting it may justify their greater opposition to redistribution.},
  keywords = {Deservingness,Economic inequality,Support for redistribution,The rich},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/72C3SLTC/Suhay et al. - 2020 - Ideology of Affluence Rich Americans' Explanation.pdf}
}

@article{titelman2021,
  title = {Can Citizens Guess How Other Citizens Voted Based on Demographic Characteristics?},
  author = {Titelman, Noam and Lauderdale, Benjamin E.},
  year = {2021},
  month = sep,
  journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  pages = {1--21},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  issn = {2049-8470, 2049-8489},
  doi = {10.1017/psrm.2021.53},
  urldate = {2022-05-11},
  abstract = {How well do citizens understand the associations between social groups and political divisions in their societies? Previous research has indicated systematic biases in how the demographic composition of party supporters are perceived, but this need not imply that citizens misperceive the likely voting behavior of specific individuals. We report results from two experiments where subjects were provided with randomly selected demographic profiles of respondents to the 2017 British Election Study (BES) and then asked to assess either (1) which party that individual was likely to have voted for in the 2017 UK election or (2) whether that individual was likely to have voted Leave or Remain in the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. We find that, despite substantial overconfidence in individual responses, on average citizens' guesses broadly reflect the actual distribution of groups supporting the parties and referendum positions.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/KNGPJXT4/Titelman and Lauderdale - 2021 - Can citizens guess how other citizens voted based .pdf;/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/8GV62SKL/97E1842BED7716BC97D589774906DBA9.html}
}

@article{trump2018a,
  title = {Income {{Inequality Influences Perceptions}} of {{Legitimate Income Differences}}},
  author = {Trump, Kris Stella},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {48},
  number = {4},
  pages = {929--952},
  issn = {14692112},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123416000326},
  abstract = {This article argues that public opinion regarding the legitimacy of income differences is influenced by actual income inequality. When income differences are perceived to be high, the public thinks of larger income inequality as legitimate. The phenomenon is explained by the system justification motivation and other psychological processes that favor existing social arrangements. Three experiments show that personal experiences of inequality as well as information regarding national-level income inequality can affect which income differences are thought of as legitimate. A fourth experiment shows that the system justification motivation is a cause of this effect. These results can provide an empirical basis for future studies to assume that the public reacts to inequality with adapted expectations, not increased demands for redistribution.},
  keywords = {Income inequality,Inequality - perceptions},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/5XX582NA/Trump - Income Inequality Influences Perceptions of Legitimate Income Differences - 2018.pdf}
}

@article{trump2023,
  title = {Income Inequality Is Unrelated to Perceived Inequality and Support for Redistribution},
  author = {Trump, Kris-Stella},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
  volume = {104},
  number = {2},
  pages = {180--188},
  issn = {1540-6237},
  doi = {10.1111/ssqu.13269},
  urldate = {2023-04-25},
  abstract = {Objectives This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between income inequality, perceptions of income inequality, and support for redistribution. In particular, it asks whether income inequality affects support for redistribution by influencing perceptions of inequality. Methods This study combines the pay ratio measures from the International Social Survey Project with income inequality measures from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database. The analysis proceeds in three steps, asking whether (1) inequality is related to perceived inequality, (2) perceived inequality is related to preferences for inequality, and (3) perceived inequality is related to support for redistribution. Results Income inequality is unrelated to perceptions of inequality. Perceptions of inequality strongly predict preferred inequality, reinforcing the prior conclusion that anchoring effects likely cause this close relationship. Perceptions of inequality also predict support for redistribution. However, because actual inequality is unrelated to perceived inequality, there is no link between actual inequality and either preferred inequality or support for redistribution. Conclusion The overall pattern of results is consistent with the interpretation that perceptions of income inequality may be politically co-determined with support for inequality and redistribution, instead of perceptions being mental antecedents of these attitudes.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/CXN2BAQD/Trump - 2023 - Income inequality is unrelated to perceived inequa.pdf}
}

@techreport{volpi2022,
  title = {A {{Distorting Mirror}}: {{Ideological}} Preferences and Mis-Perceptions of Economic Inequality},
  author = {Volpi, Elisa and Giger, Nathalie},
  year = {2022},
  month = jan,
  number = {32},
  institution = {{University of Geneva}},
  abstract = {Economic inequality is one of the most debated issues in contemporary times, yet little poli - tical action has been taken to tackle increasing levels of economic disparities. Some scholars have argued that one explanation might be people's distorted perception of their economic situation and of income inequality. The origins of this mis-perception are still unclear. In par- ticular, the role of ideology and partisan identification remains under-explored and the little research focuses almost exclusively on the United States. However, if distortions in perceptions of inequality have an ideological leaning, this could have severe consequences for how these views get translated in the political system. Taking advantage of a new survey on inequality perceptions, we are able to evaluate how partisanship affects citizens' inequality evaluations across 13 Western countries. We test how party identification influences people's perception of their economic situations and their ability to assess the overall level of inequality. We then put this partisan bias in relation with demands for redistribution. The contribution of this study is double-fold: firstly, we shed new light on the phenomenon of inequality by looking at its psy- chological roots and secondly, we examine one of its potential explanation comparatively.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Inequality - perceptions,Information effects,Support for redistribution},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/67MH9JZH/Giger - FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ.pdf}
}

@article{williamson2019,
  title = {Public {{Ignorance}} or {{Elitist Jargon}}? {{Reconsidering Americans}}' {{Overestimates}} of {{Government Waste}} and {{Foreign Aid}}},
  shorttitle = {Public {{Ignorance}} or {{Elitist Jargon}}?},
  author = {Williamson, Vanessa},
  year = {2019},
  month = jan,
  journal = {American Politics Research},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {152--173},
  issn = {1532-673X, 1552-3373},
  doi = {10.1177/1532673X18759645},
  urldate = {2022-03-30},
  abstract = {Widespread and profound public misinformation about government presents a serious challenge for democratic accountability. This article demonstrates that two of the most commonly-cited examples of public misperception of government are overstated, due in substantial part, to differences of elite and popular terminology. ``Foreign aid'' is widely understood to encompass overseas military spending, and the term ``government waste'' is popularly used to discuss systemic failures of the democratic process. Failing to take account of what members of the public mean by ``waste'' and ``foreign aid,'' existing studies overestimate public ignorance and obscure the substance of public critiques of U.S. policy, particularly among the less educated. The results of this article suggest the need for a reconsideration of what qualifies as evidence of public misinformation, and what that evidence implies for voters' capacity to assess their government.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/R44QL6TZ/Williamson - 2019 - Public Ignorance or Elitist Jargon Reconsidering .pdf}
}

@article{wiwad2019,
  title = {The {{Support}} for {{Economic Inequality Scale}}: {{Development}} and Adjudication},
  shorttitle = {The {{Support}} for {{Economic Inequality Scale}}},
  author = {Wiwad, Dylan and Mercier, Brett and Maraun, Michael D. and Robinson, Angela R. and Piff, Paul K. and Aknin, Lara B. and Shariff, Azim F.},
  year = {2019},
  month = jun,
  journal = {PLoS ONE},
  volume = {14},
  number = {6},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0218685},
  urldate = {2020-03-14},
  abstract = {Past research has documented myriad pernicious psychological effects of high economic inequality, prompting interest into how people perceive, evaluate, and react to inequality. Here we propose, refine, and validate the Support for Economic Inequality Scale (SEIS)\textendash a novel measure of attitudes towards economic inequality. In Study 1, we distill eighteen items down to five, providing evidence for unidimensionality and reliability. In Study 2, we replicate the scale's unidimensionality and reliability and demonstrate its validity. In Study 3, we evaluate a United States version of the SEIS. Finally, in Studies 4\textendash 5, we demonstrate the SEIS's convergent and predictive validity, as well as evidence for the SEIS being distinct from other conceptually similar measures. The SEIS is a valid and reliable instrument for assessing perceptions of and reactions to economic inequality and provides a useful tool for researchers investigating the psychological underpinnings of economic inequality.},
  pmcid = {PMC6588246},
  pmid = {31226135},
  keywords = {Economic inequality,Inequality - attitudes},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/9IEP86BF/Wiwad et al. - 2019 - The Support for Economic Inequality Scale Develop.pdf}
}

@article{wong2007,
  title = {``{{Little}}'' and ``{{Big}}'' {{Pictures}} in {{Our Heads}}: {{Race}}, {{Local Context}}, and {{Innumeracy About Racial Groups}} in the {{United States}}},
  author = {Wong, Cara J.},
  year = {2007},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  volume = {71},
  number = {3},
  pages = {392--412},
  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
  issn = {0033-362X},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfm023},
  urldate = {2020-03-30},
  abstract = {Abstract.  Americans do not know what percentage of the nation's residents are whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians. Using the 2000 General S},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Information effects,Race},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/TLFRKHGJ/Wong - 2007 - “Little” and “Big” Pictures in Our HeadsRace, Loca.pdf}
}

@misc{zotero-10196,
  title = {This {{Is How Much Money You Need To Be Rich In These U}}.{{S}}. {{Cities}}},
  journal = {Fatherly},
  urldate = {2022-07-27},
  abstract = {SmartAsset wanted to find out how much money someone needs to earn to be considered rich in 100 of the largest U.S cities.},
  howpublished = {https://www.fatherly.com/news/how-much-rich-in-100-largest-cities-us},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {The rich},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/XG2GIYBS/how-much-rich-in-100-largest-cities-us.html}
}

@misc{zotero-10252,
  title = {How Much Money Do You Need to Earn a Year to Be Rich? | {{YouGov}}},
  shorttitle = {How Much Money Do You Need to Earn a Year to Be Rich?},
  urldate = {2022-08-11},
  abstract = {The public puts the figure somewhere between \$90,000 and \$100,000},
  howpublished = {https://today.yougov.com/topics/economy/articles-reports/2019/01/14/how-much-money-do-you-need-earn-year-be-rich},
  langid = {american},
  file = {/Users/ktrump/Zotero/storage/II83AAUL/how-much-money-do-you-need-earn-year-be-rich.html}
}
